In this issue of Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, two important papers address the associated topics of risk disclosure and consent.
The first paper 1 comprehensively reviews 'informed consent' for anaesthesia in Australia and New Zealand, with one of the authors an established and well published legal expert in the area of the common law as applied to negligence and medical practice. The Australian law is now clear in this matter: in Rogers v. Whitaker, the High Court of Australia affirmed the Supreme Court of New South Wales' determination that a doctor has a duty to warn a patient of any "material risk" involved in a proposed treatment. A risk is considered 'material' if a 'reasonable' person in similar circumstances would attach significance to the risk, or if the doctor is, or should be, cognisant that the particular patient would express concern about the risk. Thus "failure to warn" can form a breach of a duty to the patient as part of the legal calculation of negligence. It is affirmed that patients have a right to know what is happening to them (in medical ethical terms, "autonomy" -the patient has the right to refuse or choose their treatment). The paper discusses what is "reasonable practice in various clinical contexts", supporting the view that the conduct of the process of consent is varied. There are many reasons for this, explored both previously by one of the review's authors 2 and in a broad context in the current review, with the difficulties peculiar to the practice of anaesthesia examined. There can be no argument with the precepts raised. The thrust of the review is consistent with the advice of the Australian medical indemnifiers, and it addresses some further requirements in New Zealand.
The second paper 3 surveyed 500 anaesthetists in Australia and New Zealand regarding the risks associated with four commonly encountered clinical scenarios, and the likelihood that they would be disclosed. The scenarios ring true. While the response rate to this online survey was low (29%), the hypothesis that the disclosure of risk varies widely was still supported. The survey clearly demonstrated that some anaesthetists disclose risks less often than others.
The survey also found that of the anaesthetists who responded, male anaesthetists and those exclusively in private practice were less likely to disclose risks, and that older practitioners and those practising in rural areas and in New Zealand were not less likely to disclose risks. As the authors have acknowledged, due to the low response rate, it would not be appropriate to extrapolate these findings to the entire group surveyed, let alone all anaesthetists in Australia and New Zealand. Nevertheless, these preliminary findings are of interest and are worthy of further investigation in future studies.
What does this wide range of risk disclosure mean and is it important? Is a low disclosure rate by some anaesthetists unexpected? Given the importance of risk disclosure, post Rogers v. Whitaker in the medicolegal context, one could ask whether some of the respondents to the survey were exercising what they felt was 'therapeutic privilege'? Could the withholding of information about risk, while legally proscribed, be indeed quite common? Is risk disclosure in private practice different from public practice? Is it possible that patients within the public system are more likely to have attended preadmission clinics where information about risk is routinely given in quite some detail (though possibly by junior staff and those not actually involved with the actual anaesthetic)? Is the discussion of risk less formal or more nuanced in the private system? Do the findings show perhaps that older practitioners have absorbed the lessons of Rogers v. Whitaker better than might have been thought?
What has made 'informed consent' post Rogers v. Whitaker so difficult for many practitioners is the reality that a retrospective legal determination of a 'failure to warn' can prove negligent medical practice. We can readily accept that performing at a technical level which would not satisfy one's peers can be construed as negligence. The profession knows well to 'first, do no harm' ('non-maleficence') -or to risk being judged adversely by one's peers. This, of course, is what we wish for our patients every day. However, how do we best address consent in order to satisfy the legal process, to circumvent Editorials Risk disclosure and consent Anaesth Intensive Care 2010; 38: 805-806 those rare, but disturbing occasions when legal action is initiated?
In providing guidance, the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists has published guidelines for consent for anaesthesia (PS26 2005) which address the elements of the consent process, its documentation, the place of information sheets and other proformas, and the processes required of the personnel involved. Medical indemnifiers have also provided substantial information.
A further dilemma is that, while most practitioners are now aware of the lessons of Rogers v. Whitaker, at least in general terms, many believe that patients may be at risk of knowing too much and they may exercise a degree of 'therapeutic privilege' -'beneficence' -or acting in what is believed to be in the best interests of the patient. One might expect this practice to be more prevalent in older practitioners or those in independent practice. Perhaps this might account for the findings in relation to the respondents in the survey 3 . It is not known how common the withholding of some information is, nor what the views of the specialty are on this issue. Regardless, the view of the courts is known.
A case is made for preadmission anaesthesia clinics as a means for better addressing the process of consent. Some will agree with the rationale and recommendations, while others will disagree. While there is no current evidence of a problem with efficiency, patient flow or cancellation rates in, for example, private facilities without preadmission clinics, many private practitioners would be reluctant to cede too much of the consent process to those who may be less experienced and who 'won't actually perform the anaesthesia'. The time pressures consequent to 'day of surgery admission' and 'staggered admissions' doubtless, however, constrain the anaesthesia consent processes and its documentation.
In summary, these two papers offer a timely reminder of the position of the law of negligence with respect to the 'consent process', a caution as to how little we know about what risks are disclosed or should be disclosed, and a challenge as to how consent is best achieved (and documented) on a caseby-case basis, given the difficulties peculiar to the practice of anaesthesia.
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